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Measuring patient trust: comparing measures from a survey and an economic 
experiment 
 
Abstract: Despite its importance in healthcare, empirical evidence on patient trust is limited. 
This is likely because, as with many complex concepts, trust is difficult to measure. This study 
measured patient trust in healthcare providers in a sample of 667 patients in Senegal. Two 
instruments were used to measure patient trust in providers: a survey questionnaire and an 
incentivised behavioural economic experiment – a ‘trust game’. The results show that the two 
measures are significantly, but weakly, associated. Using information from patients and 
providers, we find that continuity of care, provider communication ability and clinical 
competence were positively associated with patient trust. Based on the results obtained from 
both methods, the trust game seems to have higher construct validity than the survey instrument 
in this context. This paper contributes to the methodological literature on patient trust and the 
evidence on the determinants of patient trust. It suggests that researchers interested in studying 
patient trust in providers should rely more on economic experiments and explore their validity 
in different contexts. 
Keywords: trust, patient-provider relationship, trust game, Trust in Physician Scale, Senegal 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of research indicates that trust is crucial for economic and social development. 
Trust can reduce the cost of economic transactions and make it easier for people to cooperate 
and share information (Arrow, 1972; Dearmon & Grier, 2009; Durlauf, 2002; Putnam, 1993). 
Trust is also important in healthcare, especially in the relationship between patients and 
providers. According to  the principal-agent framework (Arrow, 1985; Grossman & Hart, 1983; 
Holmstrom, 1979), when patients (principals) seek medical care, they choose a provider (agent) 
to make decisions on their behalf. However, due to uncertainty in health care and asymmetry of 
information between patient and providers, patients cannot rely on a formal contract to ensure 
that the outcome of the interaction will be optimal for them (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; 
Mooney & Ryan, 1993). This makes seeking healthcare a risky decision, as patients may visit 
providers who do not give the best medical advice or recommend unnecessary and costly 
treatments and procedures. Patients choosing to consult a provider, therefore have to expect that 
providers will not take advantage of their vulnerable situation, but instead act in their interest, as 
perfect agents would do. This expectation, often defined in the literature as patient trust (Hall, 
Dugan, Zheng, & Mishra, 2001; Hillen, de Haes, & Smets, 2011), can therefore be seen as a 
necessary ex-ante condition for patients to demand health care and enter an informal contract 
with providers. Because it relates to patients’ perception that providers have their best interest at 
heart, trust is also key ex-post because it may influence whether patients will adhere to the 
recommendations made or medicines prescribed, therefore influencing health outcomes.   
Despite its importance in healthcare, empirical evidence on patient trust is limited. A study in 
the USA found that low levels of patient trust in providers are linked to under-utilisation of 
healthcare (LaVeist, Isaac, & Williams, 2009). Some studies have shown an association between 
higher patient trust in providers and higher patient satisfaction (Boothroyd, Della Rocca, & Chen, 
2008), or better adherence to medication (Altice, Mostashari, & Friedland, 2001; Saha, Jacobs, 
Moore, & Beach, 2010). An important challenge for empirical research on patient trust is the 
difficulty of measuring patient trust and the absence of a consensus on measurement tools. In the 
health literature, studies exploring patient trust in providers have used survey instruments 
(Brennan et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the economics literature on trust (looking at general levels of 
trust in societies) has favoured the use of a behavioural economic experiment (the ‘trust game’), 
where individuals’ responses have real monetary consequences (Berg et al., 1995; Johnson & 
Mislin, 2011). Although surveys arguably provide a more intuitive and direct measure of trust, 
economists have argued that economic experiments generate better measures of trust, partly 
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because incentivised decisions are less likely to suffer from a response bias (Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). However, in the absence of a gold standard measure of trust, this 
debate is difficult to settle. In this paper, we use both methodological approaches in the 
healthcare context and explore their construct validity, i.e. the degree to which a measure 
captures what it claims to be measuring (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  
This study makes two contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the limited methodological 
literature on the measurement of trust in general, and patient trust in providers in particular. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use and contrast results from the two 
approaches used to measure trust in providers in the health and economics literature. Secondly, 
the results add to the empirical literature on patient trust in providers, by generating evidence 
from a low-income setting (Senegal), where trust and informal contracts are likely to play an 
important role in patients’ care seeking decisions.  
We find that patients in Senegal generally trust their healthcare providers. Measures of trust 
obtained from a survey instrument are weakly, but significantly, associated with measures 
obtained from a trust game. Higher levels of trust are found for providers with better clinical 
competence and communication skills. Finally, results suggest that the trust game seems to have 
somewhat higher construct validity than the survey instrument. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section discusses the two methodological approaches used to measure trust – survey 
instruments and economic experiments – and reviews the empirical evidence on correlates of 
patient trust. Throughout, we make a distinction between generic trust (people’s general sense 
of trust, without reference to particular individuals or groups) and specific trust (trust between 
two clearly defined entities such as specifically named individuals or groups).  
2.1 Measuring trust with surveys  
Survey instruments have been used to measure generic as well as specific trust. Most surveys 
measure generic trust with a single question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. This question 
appears, for example, in the World Values Survey, the General Social Survey as well as the 
European Social Survey (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Knack & Keefer, 1997).  
To conceptualise trust in specific domains, survey instruments have been developed to measure 
specific trust, for example, between business partners (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) or in 
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close inter-personal relationships (Larzelere & Huston, 1980). Several instruments have been 
developed to measure patient trust in providers. The most commonly used in the health literature 
is the Trust in Physician Scale (TiPS)  (Anderson & Dedrick, 1990). This tool has been found to 
have high internal consistency and reliability (Freburger, Callahan, Currey, & Anderson, 2003; 
Thom, Ribisl, Stewart, & Luke, 1999). The TiPS consists of a list of eleven statements such as 
“My provider is usually considerate of my needs and puts them first” or “I trust my provider's 
judgement about my medical care”, which patients score using five-point Likert scale (for a full 
list, see online Appendix 1). 
2.2 Measuring trust with economic experiments 
Economists often use behavioural economic experiments to measure trust (Berg et al., 1995; 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011). They usually use an experiment called the trust game, or investment 
game. It is a simple decision task played for real money by two individuals: a truster and a trustee. 
One individual (truster) receives a monetary endowment and chooses how much of this 
endowment they want to send to a second individual (trustee). Any amount sent by the truster is 
multiplied by the experimenter, and the trustee who receives it has to decide which proportion 
to return to the truster. The amount of money sent by the truster is interpreted as a measure of 
their trust in the trustee. This relates to the definition of trust usually used in economics. 
According to James (2002), saying that A trusts B means that A expects that B will not exploit 
A when A is vulnerable (p.291). The trust game arguably measures this type of trust as the truster 
will only send money in the trust game if they expect that the trustee will reciprocate part of their 
generosity and not exploit it to their own benefit (i.e. if they expect a return transfer).  
Since Berg (1995) developed the trust game, almost 200 have been conducted in low as well as 
high-income settings (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Trust games are primarily used to measure 
generic trust, as most are conducted with subjects (frequently students) that have little or no 
information about one another (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). However, some studies have used trust 
games to measure specific trust, for example, between spouses (Castilla, 2015) or friends (Binzel 
& Fehr, 2013). To our knowledge, the trust game has not been used to measure trust between 
patients and providers.  
2.3 Comparing the two methods 
Whether economic games or survey instruments provide better measures of trust is much 
debated. The main concern with surveys is that respondents’ answers are likely to be influenced 
by what they perceive as socially acceptable (Krumpal, 2013; Paulhus, 1991). As a result, survey 
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measures can over- or under-estimate true levels of trust. Economists have argued that this is not 
a concern for trust games for two reasons (Glaeser et al., 2000). First, in a trust game, subjects’ 
make decisions anonymously. Second, because decisions in trust games have real monetary 
consequences, individuals are more likely to reveal their true levels of trust. However, trust 
games have other limitations, as several studies have pointed out, players’ decisions are not 
simply determined by their level of trust. In some instances, choices in the trust game are also 
likely to capture cultural or social norms. For example, in a study in Bangladesh, when asked 
why they sent money in the trust game, half of respondents mentioned “fear of punishment after 
death” as the main reason (Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2013). Furthermore, 
several studies find that decisions are also influenced by individuals’ risk aversion (Karlan, 2005; 
Schechter, 2007) or altruism (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Cox, 2004).  
Some studies have examined whether survey and experimental measures of trust are correlated. 
Most of the results pertain to measures of generic trust and show mixed evidence. Some studies 
indicate that the two measures are uncorrelated (for example, Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Holm & Nystedt, 2008), whilst others find a 
positive relationship (for example, Bellemare & Kröger, 2003; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, & 
Zingales, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, only one study, undertaken in villages in 
Cameroon, compares measures of specific trust (Etang et al., 2012). The measures of trust 
between fellow villagers elicited with a survey and a trust game were found to be positively 
associated (Etang et al., 2012).  
In this study, we seek to go beyond the simple correlation of measures and explore the validity 
of a trust game and a trust survey by using other information from respondents to capture the 
construct validity of both measures.  
2.4 Determinants of patient trust 
Most of the evidence on the determinants of patient trust comes from high-income settings, 
primarily North America (for a review, see Murray & McCrone, 2015). Only a handful of studies 
have been conducted in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) such as China (Zhao, Rao, 
& Zhang, 2016), Taiwan (Lee & Lin, 2011) or Cambodia (Ozawa & Walker, 2011). Yet, it is 
particularly relevant to study patient trust in such settings, as levels of care seeking are often low 
(for example, Herbert, Lee, Chandran, Rudan, & Baqui, 2012) and a lack of trust could be a 
contributing factor.  
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The empirical literature on the determinants of patient trust in providers has explored a limited 
range of factors. Most studies examine the association between trust and basic socio-
demographic patient characteristics (gender, age, ethnic group), but very few have explored the 
role of provider characteristics (for a review, see Murray & McCrone, 2015). This is despite the 
fact that several provider attributes are a priori likely to influence patients’ expectation of 
receiving correct treatments. For example, clinical competence has been highlighted as one of 
the key determinants of patient trust by qualitative studies (for example, Mechanic & Meyer, 
2000). Other aspects, such as providers’ communication skills are also likely to influence the 
patient’s belief about the extent to which the provider cares about their case, and their well-being 
in general (Fiscella et al., 2004). 
3. DATA  
3.1 Study setting and design 
This study took place in Senegal, a low-income country with a GDP per capita of 1,044 USD 
(WB, 2016). Data were collected in a random sample of 184 primary care facilities located in 
four rural regions (Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, Tambacounda, Kédougou). These areas are particularly 
disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country. About two thirds (68.6%) of households fall 
in the two poorest quintiles (DHS, 2015), and nearly half of the adult population is illiterate 
(ANSD, 2015). Utilisation of health services is low, as 65% of households did not seek care 
when their child was last ill (DHS, 2015). Patients who seek care primarily access government 
facilities, generally health posts and health centres – which is where this study took place. 
Bribing is uncommon in public healthcare facilities in Senegal. Data from the Afrobarometer 
survey suggest that only 11% of respondents felt like they had to do a favour or give a bribe or 
gift to a public provider in the past (Kankeu & Ventelou, 2016). Unfortunately, no disaggregated 
data are available to indicate the frequency of informal payments in study areas.The analysis 
uses four sources of data, collected between April and July 2016. Data from 667 patient exit 
interviews are used to obtain socio-demographic information about patients, their perception of 
providers’ communication abilities as well as a survey measure of their trust in providers. A 
behavioural measure of trust was obtained from a trust game implemented between those 667 
patients and the 258 providers who consulted them. Furthermore, we use data from a provider 
survey to capture socio-demographic characteristics and a measure of clinical knowledge. 
Finally, data from a facility survey provides basic information about each healthcare facility.   
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Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committees of the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the Ministry of Health in Senegal. 
3.2 Patient survey data  
In each facility visited, four patients were invited to take part in the study immediately after 
completing their consultations. All patients who were approached agreed to participate. 
The patient questionnaire included a short module to collect socio-demographic information, 
including the type of consultation the patient attended. Patients were asked to rate four aspects 
of providers’ communication skills during the consultation (greeting them, looking at them 
whilst speaking, providing information and telling them when to return). To measure patient trust 
in the provider, the questionnaire included the TiPS presented earlier. Patients were asked to give 
answers in reference to the provider they had just consulted.  
3.3 Trust game 
The second measure of trust used in this study was obtained through a trust game conducted with 
patients and their primary healthcare providers. In order to avoid a potential selection bias, 
participants were not told beforehand that they would be able to gain monetarily by taking part.  
The trust game was played at the end of the patient survey. Patients were given 1,000 FCFA 
(€1.50) and three options: keep everything, send 500 FCFA or send 1,000 FCFA to the healthcare 
provider they had just seen. Any amount sent by the patient was tripled before it was given to 
providers. Patients were informed that providers had previously decided what to do with any 
money received from patients, and that they could: return nothing, half or all of the money.  
To minimise the time that patients spent waiting for a potential return transfer from providers, 
providers’ choices were elicited the day before using the strategy method. Specifically, all 
providers in the facility were asked to indicate privately how much they would return to a patient 
in the two possible scenarios (patient sending half or all of the 1,000 FCFA). As the identity of 
patients was not known at the time, providers were told that they would be paired with “patients 
who come to this facility”. However, when taking part in the game, patients knew that they were 
paired with the provider they had just seen in the consultation – whom they were asked to 
identify. These experimental procedures ensured that patients would not fear any retribution from 
providers, making it more likely that patients would reveal their true level of trust.  
As the endowment was given in cash, patients understood that the trust game was played for real 
money. The game was played in a quiet space and patients made their decision privately – with 
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the experimenter turning their back when patients decide how much money to transfer.  Patients 
were paid shortly after making their decision, and providers were paid at the end of the following 
day, for one randomly selected patient.  
To ensure that all participants understood the game, simple visual aids were developed to 
describe the different options. The game was piloted several times. Each time, participants were 
debriefed to ascertain their understanding and refine the visual aids and instructions. 
Enumerators were extensively trained to follow a script, in order to ensure that instructions were 
identical for all participants. Further information on logistics, as well as the specific instructions 
given to patients and providers can be found in the online Appendix 2.    
3.4 Provider and facility surveys 
To obtain a measure of clinical competence, healthcare providers were invited to complete up to 
seven clinical vignettes – reflecting the types of consultations they usually conduct (see 
Appendix 3 for full case descriptions). Clinical vignettes have been used in several studies to 
measure providers’ clinical knowledge (Das et al., 2015; Mohanan et al., 2015). In the clinical 
vignettes used here, the main complaint of a fictitious patient was explained, and the provider 
was then asked how they would proceed. One enumerator played the role of the patient and 
responded to providers’ questioning according to a script, whilst another recorded the questions 
asked, the examinations done, and the treatment and advice recommended by the provider.  
Finally, a short survey was administered to the facility manager to collect basic information about 
the quality of infrastructure (availability of drugs and equipment) and facility type. 
3.5 Statistical analysis  
Two measures of patient trust are used as dependent variables in the analysis.  
A ‘survey measure’ of trust is generated by aggregating responses from the eleven TiPS 
statements using principal factor analysis. This is done to determine whether the eleven 
statements in the TiPS capture one underlying construct. Only one factor had an eigenvalue 
greater than one and explained 73% of the total variance. To obtain a single measure of trust, we 
generate an aggregate score running from 0 to 100, which weighs each item by its factor loading 
in an iterated principal factor analysis with varimax rotation (see Appendix 1).  
The ‘behavioural measure’ of trust uses patients’ responses from the trust game. Following 
previous studies, the amount of money sent by patients (0%, 50%, 100%) is used to measure 
patients’ trust in the provider.  
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Given the absence of a gold standard for measuring trust, we explore the “performance” of both 
measures of patient trust by examining their construct validity. In their comprehensive review of 
the literature, Murray and McCrone (2015) summarise a series of patient and provider 
characteristics expected to be associated with patient trust. Table 1 summarises the 
characteristics captured in this study and indicates the expected direction of their association 
with patient trust. These characteristics are used to assess the construct validity of the two 
measures of trust. 
Table 1: Overview of determinants of patient trust 
Variable  Rationale Expected Direction 
Patient education 
 
More educated patients have different criteria for 
assessing whom they trust 
Unclear 
Continuity of care Trust develops over time  Positive 
Patient ethnic group 
 
Patients from minority groups have lower levels of trust  Lower for minorities 
Provider gender 
 
Used by patients to assess competence  Higher for male 
providers 
Type of consultation 
 
Patients coming for curative consultations have different 
criteria for assessing whom they trust 
Unclear 
Provider ethnic group Used by patients to assess competence  Lower for minorities 
Provider skill/ position Used by patients to assess competence  Positive 
Provider 
communication ability  
Signals caring Positive 
Provider clinical 
competence  
Determines providers’ ability to achieve positive patient 
outcomes 
Positive 
Provider from same 
ethnic group as patient  
Patients place more trust in people who are similar to 
them  
Positive 
 
We first present descriptive evidence on patient trust. We then explore whether there is an 
association between survey and behavioural trust using linear multi-level regressions. To explore 
construct validity, both measures of trust are regressed on patient, provider and facility 
characteristics in the following specification:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗  
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the measure of trust (survey or behavioural), 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of patient characteristics, 
𝑍𝑗 is a vector of provider characteristics and 𝐹𝑗 is a vector of facility characteristics. We use 
linear and ordered multi-level regressions to take into account that data are hierarchical (in the 
sense that multiple patients i indicate how much they trust the same provider j). Hence, the 
residual is split into two components, reflecting the two levels in the data: 𝑢𝑗  captures the group-
level residual and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  the individual residual. 
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4. RESULTS  
4.1 Patient trust in providers 
Descriptive statistics of patient and healthcare provider characteristics are presented and briefly 
discussed in online Appendix 5. This section provides a descriptive overview of the behavioural 
and survey measures of trust.  
In the trust game, as shown in Figure 1, the majority of patients (57.1 %) sent half of their 
endowment, while 6.5% chose to send nothing. Overall, the average amount sent is 65% of the 
initial endowment. Sending money was a good investment decision for most patients, as only 
1.2% of patients received less than the amount sent. 
The survey measure of trust is heavily skewed towards high levels of trust (see Figure 2). The 
average survey score is 88.1 out of 100 (with a standard deviation of 9.4). Only three patients 
scored below 50, and 11% of patients have the maximum score of 100.   
 
Figure 1: Behavioural trust, amount sent in the trust 
game by 667 patients in rural Senegal in 2016 
 
Figure 2: Survey trust, TiPS scores for 667 patients in 
rural Senegal in 2016 
4.2 Trust in games and surveys  
Turning to the association between the two measures of trust, we first plot the amount sent by 
each patient in the trust game against their trust survey score (Figure 3). From this representation, 
no relationship between the two scores is immediately apparent. Nonetheless, patients who sent 
everything in the trust game seem concentrated around high levels of survey trust. Similarly, all 
patients who score below 60 in the trust survey sent none or half of their endowment.  
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Figure 3:  Survey and behavioural trust scores for 667 patients in rural Senegal 
 
Table 2 reports regressions of survey trust on behavioural trust using linear multi-level 
regressions. Model 1 does not include any other variables and Model 2 controls for patient and 
provider characteristics. The association between the two measures of patient trust is statistically 
significant in both models, but of a relatively small magnitude. For patients who sent none of 
their endowment, rather than all of their endowment, the average trust survey score decreases by 
3.6% or 0.34 standard deviations, all else equal. Patients who sent half of their endowment (rather 
than all) have an average trust survey score that is 1.3% lower (0.15 standard deviations), all else 
equal. 
Table 2: Survey trust and behavioural trust (linear multi-level regressions) 
 Survey 
 (1) (2) 
Patient sends 100%   
Patient sends 0% -0.343** -0.337** 
 (0.148) (0.147) 
Patient sends 50% -0.152** -0.126* 
 (0.0745) (0.0745) 
Patient and provider characteristics:  YES 
Number of groups (providers) 258 258 
Observations (patients)  667 667 
Note: Association between survey and behavioural trust for 667 patients in rural Senegal. Data were collected in 
2016. A standardized trust survey score is used in both models. Model 2 controls for patient literacy, the type of 
consultation, patient ethnic group, provider sex, provider ethnic group and facility type. Standard errors in 
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3 Determinants of patient trust  
This section investigates the correlates of patient trust. All results presented here are robust to 
alternative specifications (see Appendix 6). The proportional odds assumption is not violated for 
any of the ordered models presented below. 
Models 1 to 3 in Table 3 show that three relevant variables are associated with survey trust. 
Patients who are literate in French score slightly lower on the trust survey. Patients who visited 
their provider before score 0.6 standard deviations higher on the trust survey, and those who saw 
a communicative provider score 0.5 standard deviations higher.   
Table 3: Determinants of patient trust (linear and ordered multilevel regressions) 
 Trust survey Trust game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Patient reads French -0.156** -0.185** -0.182** 0.899 0.933 0.863 
 (0.0716) (0.0741) (0.0732) (0.178) (0.186) (0.170) 
Patient visited provider before 0.617*** 0.646*** 0.646*** 1.448* 1.494** 1.532** 
 (0.0720) (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.286) (0.293) (0.303) 
Type of consultation (curative) 0.0277 -0.0942 -0.0870 0.782 0.795 0.711* 
 (0.0780) (0.0799) (0.0787) (0.163) (0.165) (0.146) 
Male provider 0.172* 0.163 0.144 1.355 1.479* 1.330 
 (0.0990) (0.106) (0.104) (0.297) (0.327) (0.295) 
Unskilled Provider -0.108 -0.128 -0.103 0.434** 0.563 0.441** 
 (0.150) (0.164) (0.158) (0.148) (0.197) (0.153) 
Communicative provider  0.504***   1.570**   
 (0.0724)   (0.316)   
Provider clinical competence  0.00108   1.023***  
  (0.00321)   (0.00700)  
Patient from minority group 0.137 0.146  0.862 0.777  
 (0.167) (0.173)  (0.391) (0.353)  
Provider from minority group -0.127 -0.0873  1.022 0.962  
 (0.122) (0.130)  (0.270) (0.256)  
From same ethnic group   -0.0279   0.878 
   (0.0920)   (0.197) 
Number of groups (providers) 258 258 258 258 258 258 
Observations (patients)  667 667 667 667 667 667 
Note: Determinants of patient trust for 667 patients in rural Senegal. Data were collected in 2016. A standardized 
trust survey score is used in Model 1 – Model 3 (linear multi-level regressions). An ordinal measure of the amount 
sent in the trust game is used in Model 4 – Model 6 (ordered multi-level regressions.). Consultation type is coded 
as curative or not curative (ante-natal or family planning visit). All models control for the following variables that 
were not significantly associated with either measure of trust: facility type (health post or health centre), quality of 
infrastructure in facilities, low consultation volumes (less than 4 patients on the day data were collected), provider 
work experience in the facility. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Models 4 to 6 show that four relevant variables are associated with behavioural trust. The 
probability of sending a larger endowment is 30% higher for patients who visited the provider 
before and for those who saw a communicative provider. We find evidence that provider clinical 
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competence is associated with behavioural trust. Patients send less to unskilled providers, as well 
as those with lower clinical competence. The probability of sending a larger endowment is 40% 
lower when the provider is unskilled. The probability of sending all of the endowment is 0.24 
for providers who completed 20% of items in the vignettes correctly, 0.36 for those who 
completed half of the items correctly and 0.60 for providers who completed all relevant items in 
the vignettes correctly. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our results show that in a context where few patients seek care, those who do have high levels 
of trust in providers. Levels of survey trust found here are high relative to comparable studies 
using the TiPS. For example, a study with Chinese patients reported a mean score of 64 
(compared to our mean of 88) (Zhao et al., 2016). Whilst respondents’ answers in the survey 
might be affected by social expectations (thereby exaggerating true levels of trust), our 
behavioural measure of trust – which is arguably not subject to such a bias – also indicated high 
levels of trust. In the trust game, 65% of the endowment was sent on average and only 6.5% of 
patients did not send anything. These results are similar to trust games conducted in comparable 
contexts, for example in Cameroon, where the average amount sent was 74% of the initial 
endowment (Etang et al., 2012). 
This study provides evidence on the correlates of patient trust in providers in a low-income 
setting. Even though the role of competence in trust has been explored in other settings (Johnston, 
Mills, & Landrum, 2015), this study is the first to examine whether patient trust is empirically 
associated with provider clinical competence, which is a priori plausible. Patients sent higher 
proportions of their endowment to skilled providers and to those with a higher level of clinical 
competence. In line with what has been found in some high-income settings, in this low-income 
setting, patient trust is negatively associated with patient education and positively associated 
with continuity of care and provider communication ability (for a review, see Murray & 
McCrone, 2015).  
Our measures of survey and behavioural trust are significantly associated, although the 
association is not very strong. This indicates that even though the two measures appear to capture 
similar concepts, there are also substantial differences. When examining the construct validity 
of both measures of trust we find that the behavioural measure is associated with a larger number 
of relevant factors than the survey measure of trust. This suggests that the trust game has 
somewhat higher construct validity. Hence, even though trust games are much more complex 
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logistically and substantially more costly, they do appear to produce measures of trust with 
higher validity. This might be because patients over-state their true levels of trust in the survey 
to conform to social expectations (Krumpal, 2013; Paulhus, 1991). In this study, social 
expectations are likely to be highly relevant as patients are asked if they trust the provider they 
just consulted and might be unwilling to admit that they actually do not trust the person they 
have just relied on for a service. Another plausible explanation would be that it is monetarily 
costly for patients to deviate from their true preferences in the trust game, whilst this is not the 
case in the survey (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2013). 
There are potential ethical concerns with conducting a trust game with patients and healthcare 
providers. To begin with, patients might fear future retribution from providers if they did do not 
transfer anything. To alleviate such concerns, the anonymity of patients was maintained – as 
providers were not aware who they were paired with. Providers were also paid for a randomly 
selected patient, which added to this anonymity. Another potential concern is that patients who 
did not receive a return transfer from providers would be less trusting in providers in the future. 
However, this was not an issue in this study as all but 1% of patients received less than what they 
had sent.   
This study is limited in several respects. To begin with, patients only had a restricted number of 
choices in the trust game. Given more options, patients could have expressed their trust in 
providers in a more nuanced way. However, for logistical reasons as well as to avoid placing an 
added cognitive burden on participants (associated with a game of increased complexity), we 
decided to limit the number of options available to patients. Another potential shortcoming 
relates to the limited number of relevant variables used when assessing construct validity. For 
example, previous studies have highlighted that factors such as patient insurance status or income 
(Zhao et al., 2016) are associated with patient trust. Insurance status is not pertinent in the study 
setting and income is difficult elicit and was unlikely to vary substantially in the study population 
(DHS, 2015). Nonetheless, findings may have been affected by residual confounding due to 
known, as well as unknown confounders that were not included in the analysis. 
In order to substantiate and expand the work presented here, further research should be conducted 
in other contexts, to determine the external validity of the findings. This study was conducted in 
a relatively poor segment of the population living in rural areas in Senegal. Even though Senegal 
is not dissimilar from other LMICs (particularly in West Africa) in terms of its main health 
system characteristics, it stands out in terms of religious and ethnic homogeneity and the stability 
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of its political institutions. It is therefore unclear whether findings would hold in more urban 
areas or in other LMICs. Moreover, future studies in LMICs should attempt to relate different 
measures of patient trust to patient-level outcomes such as care seeking, health status or 
medication adherence – as has been done in high-income settings. If some measures of patient 
trust are related to these important outcomes, whilst other are not, this would provide further 
valuable evidence on construct validity.     
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